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STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATE-COURT 
DEFERENCE OR DISSONANCE? 
ARTHUR LEAVENS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some twenty-five years ago Lawrence Sager asked “the inevi­
table question” concerning state constitutionalism, a question that 
even then was beginning to sound old; that is, “to what extent, if 
any, should state judges faced with claims under provisions of their 
state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to Supreme 
Court interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provi­
sions?”1  Purely as a matter of positive law, Dean Sager’s answer to 
this question was, almost never.2  This potential for state-court dis­
sonance owed to what Dean Sager described as “vast” spaces in our 
federal constitutional law that remain “untiled,” leaving ample lati­
tude for state-court judges to fill in these spaces with state-constitu­
tional law.3  But just because state courts can disagree with the 
Supreme Court does not mean that they should.  As Dean Sager 
noted, the argument for state-court deference to Supreme Court 
interpretations of what are fundamental norms common to both the 
nation and its fifty states does not rest on the lack of positive state-
law authority for such independent interpretations “but [rather] on 
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. I would 
like to thank my colleagues Bruce Miller, Sam Stonefield, and Giovanna Shay for their 
encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and Dean Art 
Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project. 
1. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between 
the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985). 
2. Id. at 960.  Dean Sager qualified his answer with what he characterized as two 
“rather minor” conditions, i.e., first, that the state-constitutional decisions be clearly 
ones of state, not federal, law, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), and 
second, that the decisions be ones that do not conflict with what he termed “extant 
federal constitutional norms,” presumably including the Fourteenth Amendment’s doc­
trine of incorporation.  Sager, supra note 1, at 959. R 
3. Sager, supra note 1, at 960.  By “untiled” constitutional space, Dean Sager was R 
referring to potential constitutional protection of individual rights that either had not 
yet been decided by the Supreme Court under the Constitution or was more protective 
than that which the Supreme Court had interpreted the Constitution to provide, in ei­
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notions” of decisional legitimacy and “judicial responsibility.”4  If 
some deference is called for, what, as Dean Sager reframes the 
question, is its “operational content”?5 
None of this was new even a quarter century ago; yet, though 
the scholarship has been rich,6 the question still remains. This Arti­
cle will focus on one area of the debate, that concerning state con­
stitutional expansion of criminal-procedure protections. This 
Article will examine two such rights: (1) the protection against un­
reasonable searches and seizures;7 and (2) the right to the assistance 
of counsel in defending a criminal case.8  Each of these rights is 
embodied in both the federal and most, if not all, state constitu­
tions.  Each right is thus doubly applicable to the states, first, 
through the federal version by virtue of its incorporation into the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection and, second, 
through the state constitution’s version of the cognate right.  So fo­
cused, the question is, what deference if any does a state court owe 
the Supreme Court in interpreting state constitutional provisions 
protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures and affording 
the criminally accused the right to counsel? 
This Article will explore this question of deference in the con­
text of a particular state, Massachusetts, employing that focus for 
three reasons.  First, the Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights— 
which has remained virtually unchanged since its adoption in 
1780—served as a principal model for the federal Bill of Rights,9 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 961. 
6. A sample of the literature includes JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS (2005) [hereinafter INTERPRETING  STATE  CONSTITUTIONS]; G. ALAN 
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Crimi­
nal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1141(1985); Symposium, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1219 (2005); Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized 
State Constitutional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265 (2007); Jack L. Landau, Hurrah 
for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 793 (2000); Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State’s Bill of Rights, 
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Symposium, Independent State Grounds: Should State 
Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment in Construing Their Own Constitutions, and 
if so, on What Basis Beyond Simple Disagreement with the United States Supreme 
Court’s Result?, 77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme 
Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Consti­
tutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997) [hereinafter In the 
Glare of the Supreme Court]. 
7. See infra notes 128-169 and accompanying text. R 
8. See infra notes 95-127 and accompanying text. R 
9. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1947) (reviewing this histori­
cal linkage); see also Akhil R. Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of 
 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE102.txt unknown Seq: 3 27-SEP-11 11:17 
2011] STATE-COURT DEFERENCE OR DISSONANCE? 83 
leaving no doubt but that textually and historically the federal and 
state provisions at issue here are essentially the same. This poses 
the interpretive question most starkly; in each case, we are consid­
ering federal and state versions of what was to their respective 
framers the same normative protection.  Second, unlike most state 
court judges, the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court are appointed and have lifetime tenure, putting them in the 
same, politically-insulated position as their federal counterparts.10 
This poses the issue of decisional legitimacy in bold relief, forcing 
consideration of the counter-majoritarian aspects of judicial review. 
Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court has been quite active over the 
past three decades in this area of state constitutionalism, much of 
this activity in the area of criminal procedure.11  Its jurisprudence in 
state constitutionalism is thus well rehearsed and provides a good 
backdrop for this discussion of such state-court decision making. 
To begin, my answer to Dean Sager’s question, which I will 
briefly outline below and then develop in the balance of this piece, 
is that state courts should presumptively defer to the judgment of 
the Supreme Court concerning the meaning and scope of a cognate 
constitutional norm.  The normative protections at issue, both the 
two I have selected as well as the others imposed on the states 
through the incorporation doctrine, are limited to fundamental val­
ues that lie at the core of our justice system.  Because in our federal 
construct states are neither fully independent nor politically auton­
omous, the national meaning of such norms should, at least pre­
sumptively, prevail. 
But that presumed deference is only an analytic starting point, 
and it may give way depending on the nature of the constitutional 
norm in question.  The two constitutional norms I will examine, 
search and seizure and right to counsel, offer not just different pro­
tections, but different kinds of protection. The protection against 
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 67-68 (1996) (tracking the historical connection 
between Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment); Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams 
Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of Massachu­
setts’ Declaration of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 319-20 (2007) (reviewing this historical 
linkage); Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 887, 928 (1980) [hereinafter Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declara­
tion of Rights] (noting “the common source of the principles expressed in [the federal 
Bill of Rights and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]”). 
10. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A 
Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369, 371 (1988). 
11. See Grasso, supra note 9 passim (cataloging and discussing this R 
phenomenon). 
84 
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unreasonable search and seizures marks off an area of substantive 
protection against governmental, mostly investigative, intrusions;12 
that is, the norm itself constitutes a particular liberty interest, un­
derstanding “liberty” is understood to mean a personal freedom 
that the government may not restrain.13  In contrast, the right to be 
represented by counsel in a criminal trial, along with similar rights 
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right to a 
jury trial, does not stake out and protect a particular area of free­
dom from governmental interference.14  Rather, it provides proce­
dural protection against the government when it seeks to convict an 
individual of a crime and thus to deprive that person of personal 
freedom, typically through imprisonment.15  Such a procedural 
12. The Fourth Amendment provides:
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef­
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
 
things to be seized.
 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights provides: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and 
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.  All war­
rants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them 
be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the 
warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one 
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied 
with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: 
and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities pre­
scribed by the laws. 
MASS. CONST. art. XIV. 
13. See Ronald Dworkin, Keynote Address: Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 469, 471 (2010) (symposium issue devoted to a conference on Dworkin’s forth­
coming book, JUSTICE FOR  HEDGEHOGS); see also INTERPRETING  STATE  CONSTITU­
TIONS, supra note 6, at 84 (conceptualizing liberty more broadly, as encompassing R 
affirmative governmental powers as well as particular restraints on those powers neces­
sary to promote “public welfare” or “public good”).  Building on this broader concept 
of liberty, I will suggest that the Fourth Amendment and its state cognate, Article 14, 
can be seen as providing and protecting two liberty interests—individual protections 
against law-enforcement authority and collective protections promoting public safety— 
balancing one against the other. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. R 
14. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prose­
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights provides in 
pertinent part that “every subject [held to answer for any crime or offence] shall have a 
right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council, at his election.” 
MASS. CONST. art. XII. 
15. “[The Supreme] Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel [is necessary] in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”  Strick­
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). 
85 
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norm, though constitutionally enumerated and fundamentally im­
portant, does not define a protected liberty interest; instead, it 
works with other such norms to protect against wrongful conviction 
and the general deprivation of personal liberty that would result.16 
This distinction is important to my answer to Dean Sager’s 
question for two reasons.  First, the liberty interest in freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures constitutes an important sub­
stantive part of our nation’s normative separation between legiti­
mate governmental activities and personal freedoms with which the 
government may not interfere.17  Given the subordinate status of 
states in our federal political construct, it simply does not make 
sense that a state court should be able to independently redraw this 
normative line based on no more than disagreement with the Su­
preme Court concerning its location.  As one of our nation’s foun­
dational principles, this liberty interest should have the same 
content across the land.  In contrast, state constitutional expansion 
of a procedural protection such as the right to counsel does not 
disturb the national boundary that marks the content of our liber­
ties on the one hand and permissible governmental power on the 
other.  If anything, the liberty interest that such a procedural norm 
protects—freedom from wrongful conviction—would be ratified by 
a state’s expansion of the protection beyond that offered by the 
Sixth Amendment, thus strengthening rather than undercutting the 
uniformity of our nation’s foundational liberty interests. 
Even if one regards this uniformity interest as largely symbolic 
and is thus prepared to accept state-by-state differences in the con­
tent of our nation’s core liberty interests, there is a second theoreti­
cal problem with state constitutional expansion of the search-and­
seizure norm, again stemming from the subordinate status of states 
in our federal system.18  To have a constitution that is worthy of 
both the name and treatment as such—that is, a written instrument 
adopted by a sovereignty that establishes as a foundational matter 
the powers and duties of government as well as the particular limi­
tations of governmental power, thereby guaranteeing certain rights 
16. Id. at 684. 
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
18. See James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Consti­
tutional Positivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1254-59 (2005) [hereinaf­
ter Whose Constitution Is It?]. 
 
86 
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to the people against governmental power19—a state must have suf­
ficient independence or autonomy to deliver on the protections it 
there guarantees.  As I will argue below, there is a serious question 
as to whether a state has the political autonomy necessary for its 
courts to impose, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, a 
state-specific reordering of the search-and-seizure normative man­
date.20  In each state, there is significant federal law-enforcement 
presence, utilizing officers as well as courts that are not subject to 
state constitutional limits on searches and seizures; indeed, this 
freedom to ignore state constitutional limits on searches and 
seizures can even extend to state and local police in certain circum­
stances.21  States are thus in a poor position to guarantee their citi­
zens the enhanced protection that a state constitutional expansion 
of the search and seizure norm purports to offer.  It is therefore 
difficult to recognize the sort of state control over the search-and­
seizure norm that seems a theoretical predicate for its constitutional 
construction and enforcement.22  Again, the same is not true for 
procedural protections such as the right to counsel.23  The impact of 
those normative protections occurs exclusively within a state’s court 
system, an area of undoubted state authority and control.24 
Finally, as I will develop, there are practical and prudential 
reasons that combine with these two conceptual reasons to counsel 
state-court deference to the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
search-and-seizure norm but that overcome the presumption of 
such deference in interpreting the right-to-counsel norm. 
My argument will proceed in two parts. First, I will outline its 
doctrinal background, which by now is familiar territory.  I will then 
turn to the development of my presumption-based approach, begin­
ning with its underlying premises and a review of the competing 
interpretive theories in state constitutionalism, and concluding with 
my norm-specific answers to Dean Sager’s question. 
19. This is the positivist, Lockean view of a constitution, an instrument limning 
the metes and bounds of the power delegated by “the people” to the government that 
these people have come together to form. Id. at 1249-50. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See TARR, supra note 6, at 173-209. R 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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I. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
For the first 150 years or so of the Declaration of Rights’ exis­
tence, the federal and state constitutions operated on parallel 
tracks, the federal Bill of Rights applying only to the federal gov­
ernment25 and state constitutions applying to their respective gov­
ernments.  However, with the post-Civil War enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, federal due process protection was ex­
panded to apply to state governments and their actors.  Over the 
next century, reaching its height in the rights revolution of the 
1960s, almost all of the federal Bill of Rights were “incorporated” 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection and thus 
became applicable to the states, creating the rights overlap here at 
issue.26 
This applicability of federal rights to the states caused little 
confusion at first.27  The federal rights set the minimum level of 
protection that individuals enjoyed against state governments, leav­
ing a state court free as a matter of positive law to interpret a state 
constitutional provision to provide greater protection than the anal­
ogous federal provision.28  But because the Supreme Court that ex­
tended those federal rights to the states—for the most part the 
Warren Court—also took a broad view of those rights, few if any 
state courts were inclined to further extend the protection thus im­
posed.29  As a practical matter, the rights revolution of the Warren 
Court overwhelmed the states, including Massachusetts, and the 
Court led the way in the development of constitutional doctrine in 
this area of rights overlap.30 
State court interpretive deference to the Supreme Court began 
to erode in the 1970s in response to the Court’s retrenchment, first 
under Chief Justice Burger and then Chief Justice Rehnquist, re­
garding the scope of individual rights.31  Dissatisfied with the nar­
rowing of federal constitutional protections, state courts—the 
Supreme Judicial Court among them32—began to respond, albeit 
25. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833). 
26. See TARR, supra note 6, at 181-84. R 
27. Id. at 183. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 161-65. 
30. See Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note 
9, at 920-21. R 
31. See TARR, supra note 6 (cataloging this development). R 
32. As Justice Wilkins observed in 1980: 
In recent years, the Supreme Judicial Court has exercised the option to
 
impose higher state constitutional standards in some instances and, in many
 
88 
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cautiously in the beginning, with opinions that took a broader view 
than did the Supreme Court concerning the scope of particular indi­
vidual rights.33  This emergent willingness of state courts to inter­
pret state constitutional provisions more broadly than the cognate, 
in some cases identical, federal provisions brought on the debate 
concerning the legitimacy and wisdom of what could be seen as 
state-by-state overrides of applicable federal law. 
II. THE QUESTION: DEFERENCE OR DISSONANCE? 
A. Underlying Premises 
There is no doubt as to the positive-law authority of state 
courts, Massachusetts’s Supreme Judicial Court among them, to in­
terpret the constitutions of their respective states independent of 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar, or even identical, 
provisions in the federal Constitution.34  State constitutions provide 
that authority limited only by the federal Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, which requires state court judges to follow federal law 
where and as it applies.35  If a particular federal constitutional right 
has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro­
cess Clause and is thus applicable to the states, state courts are 
bound to apply that protection as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, but these mandated federal rights do no more than establish 
the minimum protection owed to individuals against state govern-
other instances, without exercising that option, the court has explicitly ac­
knowledged its authority to act independently under the state constitution.
 
While these rumblings are not yet powerful and appear only in certain consti­
tutional areas, they are intensifying, suggesting that the personal freedoms of
 
the Declaration of Rights may be about to receive new attention.
 
Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 889-90. R 
Although Justice Wilkins went on to note what he characterized as the “historical reti­
cence” of the Supreme Judicial Court “to alter even judge-made or common law princi­
ples,” id. at 890 n.9, his prediction of increased attention on the Declaration of Rights 
by the Court has proved prescient.  See, for example, Grasso, supra note 9, for a sum- R 
mary and thoughtful critique of search-and-seizure decisions in which the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court has interpreted Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to 
provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment. 
33. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that a decision of a state court resting on “adequate and independent [of federal law] 
state grounds” is insulated from its review even though the decision is directly contrary 
to its decision based on an analogous, or even identical, federal constitutional provision. 
The Court in Long stated that this state-ground basis of decision must be “clearly and 
expressly” stated to avoid federal review, id. at 1041, a requirement easily satisfied by a 
simple statement to that effect. 
34. Sager, supra note 1, at 959. R 
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ment actions.36  State courts are free—again, as a matter of positive 
law—to interpret and apply the provisions of their respective state 
constitutions that protect those same rights.  If the state court inter­
prets these protections to be greater than their federal counterparts, 
the enhanced state protections prevail. 
The challenge, as Dean Sager puts it, is identifying the extent, 
if any, to which state courts should defer to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision in exercising that 
authority to expand analogous state constitutional protection be­
yond that federal protection.37  Any such deference would flow not 
from positive law, but from more amorphous constraints such as the 
nature of judicial decision making and judicial responsibility that 
inhere in our federal system of democratic government.38  Because 
such deference flies in the face of the positive-law authority of state 
courts to interpret their respective constitutions, it is fair to put the 
burden on one who would limit its exercise based on conceptual 
limitations like decisional legitimacy and judicial restraint.  How 
does my argument meet that burden? 
Let me start with some plausible attributes of responsible judi­
cial decision making by a state court in our federal system that fea­
tures dual enforcement of fundamental norms. This is an issue 
which has occupied countless scholars, judges, and lawyers and has 
resulted in an immense literature that has yet to yield a consensus, 
and I do not pretend here to capture where the matter stands.  But 
it seems fair at least to say that a state court—particularly one 
whose members are appointed and thus insulated from the political 
process—should exercise its interpretive authority in a principled 
fashion, not as an exercise of political will. That is, constitutional 
interpretation should be based on established, plausibly neutral in­
terpretive principles.  These principles require attention to the text, 
history, and underlying intellectual foundation of the provision in 
question as well as respect for the limits inherent in judicial decision 
making, such as attention to established and ostensibly binding pre­
cedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.  In short, constitutional in­
terpretation should employ the recognized tools of appropriate 
36. See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in the State Courts: The New 
Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 251 (1999). 
37. Sager, supra note 1, at 959. 
38. Id. at 960-61. 
 
90 
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judicial decision making as opposed to the unbounded policy-based 
decision making that characterizes the legislative process.39 
A second premise on which my argument rests flows from the 
anomalous nature of state constitutionalism. As Professor James 
Gardner has written, the very idea of a subordinate polity like a 
state having a constitution is at best odd.40  In the classical positivist 
view, constitutions are written instruments adopted by the constitu­
ents of an independent sovereignty giving structure and ceding 
power to some form of government but imposing particular limita­
tions on the exercise of that power against the constituent citi­
zenry.41  Given that a state does not enjoy such sovereign autonomy 
but rather is a subordinate part of the United States, it is difficult— 
at least as a matter of theory—to justify a state’s constitutional 
norms displacing those of the nation, imposing limits on elected of­
ficials more stringent than those imposed by the cognate national 
norms. 
Of course, in our federal system, states are not mere regional 
departments fully subordinate to the federal government.  As Pro­
fessor Gardner observes, states are by design partly subordinate to, 
but partly independent of, the nation of which they are a part.42 
The key, then, is to identify those areas in which a state has suffi­
cient independence in our federal construct to substitute its consti­
tutional limitations for analogous federal limitations on state 
officials directly accountable to the people, thus changing within 
that state the normative relationship between the citizens and their 
government. 
39. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to Non-Article 
III Actors, 83 NOTRE  DAME L. REV. 1303, 1308-09 (2008) (distinguishing judicial au­
thority from legislative authority by observing that judicial departures from precedent 
require justification in recognized principles); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360 (2006) (arguing that courts have no 
demonstrable competency advantage over legislatures in construing constitutional-
rights provisions); cf. Richard Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1716-18 (2008) (conceding that judicial review may lack demo­
cratic legitimacy due to its counter-majoritarian nature, but arguing that it promotes 
overall governmental legitimacy to the extent that it protects against violations of, 
mostly, individual rights). 
I certainly do not mean to say that policy has no place in constitutional interpreta­
tion.  Policy is essential to unlocking the meaning and proper application of the pur­
posely indeterminate norms here at issue.  But a court’s employment of policy ought to 
respect the constraints that inhere in the judicial function. 
40. Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1253. R 
41. See, e.g., INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6. 
42. Whose Constitution Is It?, supra, note 18, at 1254. R 
 
91 
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To be clear, I have no doubt that a state legislature may impose 
limitations on state officials that extend protections of its citizens 
beyond those required by federal constitutional norms.  As the gov­
ernmental organ elected by and thus politically accountable to the 
people, a decision by the legislature to restrict the use of state 
power for policy reasons is wholly appropriate. The question here 
is the legitimacy of state courts doing so through constitutional 
interpretation. 
My premise here is straightforward.  For a state court to substi­
tute its interpretation of a cognate constitutional provision for that 
of the Supreme Court, thus increasing a particular limitation on 
governmental power vis-a-vis individuals within that state, the 
emergent state constitutional norm must be one that will be fully 
effective within that state.  If there are governmental actors in the 
state who may ignore the more protective normative mandate (and 
thus state citizens who must suffer the ostensibly forbidden govern­
mental conduct), that restructured norm has no claim to constitu­
tional status.  Quite simply, a norm that governmental actors are 
free to disobey cannot be regarded as one of the foundational prin­
ciples that limits governmental power within that state.  In such a 
case, the state (acting through its courts) lacks the sovereign auton­
omy necessary to rely on that norm as a constitutional limitation on 
its government.  In contrast, if a state constitutional interpretation 
expanding protection beyond that afforded by the federal cognate 
is capable of full enforcement within the state, the state has suffi­
cient autonomy to justify such a constitutional mandate. 
This insistence on state autonomy as a necessary predicate for 
state constitutional expansion of cognate norms is underscored by 
recalling that the constitutional protections at issue here are limited 
to those that have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend­
ment’s Due Process Clause.43  The Supreme Court’s criterion for 
incorporation is that the norm be “fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty and system of justice,”44 one of the “fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions.”45  The rhetoric may change from case to 
43. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35 (2010). 
44. See id. at 3032 (citing and quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 & 
n.14 (1968), in holding that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms is incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and thus applicable to the 
states). 
45. Id. at 3034.  Over the years, the Court has described these rights in a variety 
of ways, for example, as a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,” Gideon v. Wain­
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case, but the idea is the same.  Only fundamental rights—essentially 
those set forth in the Bill of Rights46—have been imposed through 
incorporation on states.  So, the cognate state and federal constitu­
tional provisions at issue here, which share virtually identical texts, 
history and ideological foundations,47 are at bottom no more than 
state and federal versions of the same core norms.  If a state court is 
going to disagree with the Supreme Court concerning the meaning 
or reach of such a norm, in effect overruling the Court in that re­
gard within its state, at the very least it should be a norm as to 
which the state can claim autonomy grounded in its ability fully to 
enforce its version of the shared normative command within its bor­
ders.  Anything short of that risks limitation by constitutional 
pretense. 
Of course, these premises—even if one accepts them—do not 
answer Dean Sager’s question concerning state deference to the Su­
preme Court.  However, they set the parameters of the discussion 
to which I now turn, beginning with the competing theories of state 
constitutionalism. 
B. Competing Interpretive Theories 
Three interpretive approaches have emerged over the years to 
deal with this puzzle: the total-deference or so-called lockstepping 
approach, the state-primacy approach, and the supplemental or in­
terstitial approach.48 
1. Lockstepping 
The first approach, sometimes called lockstepping,49 reflects a 
top-down view of constitutional interpretation.  Under this ap­
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942)), 
or “a procedure [that] is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty,” 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14.  However it is described, the overlap of federal and 
state protection here at issue is confined to core normative values embodied in the 
federal and state constitutions. 
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034-35 & n.13 (noting that “[o]nly a handful of the 
Bill of Rights protections remain unincorporated” and listing five: “the Sixth Amend­
ment right to a unanimous jury verdict[;] . . . the Third Amendment’s protection against 
quartering of soldiers; . . . the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement; 
. . . the Seventh Amendment[’s] right to a jury trial in civil cases; and . . . the Eight 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines” (citations and numbering omitted)). 
47. As noted above, Articles 12 and 14 preceded and served as models for their 
federal counterparts. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
48. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 6, at 180-85. R 
49. See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDI­
VIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES §1.06[2] (4th ed. 2006); TARR, supra note 6, at R 
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proach, state courts interpreting state constitutional provisions 
openly and almost automatically defer to the Supreme Court’s in­
terpretation of the federal cognate.50  Such conformity between 
state and federal constitutional protections reflects the national 
supremacy in the state-federal relationship.  Moreover, its emergent 
uniform standards are consistent with the notion that constitutional 
interpretation flows from law, not judicial preference, which pro­
motes at least the appearance of principled decision making.51  That 
said,52 this insistence that state constitutions conform jit-for-jit, jot-
for-jot to their federal counterpart flies in the face of the dual sov­
ereignty that is an essential feature of our federal system.  States 
may not be wholly independent sovereigns in the sense that a na­
tion is, but neither are they mere regional administrative subdivi­
sions of our nation.53  And, while our state-federal system of dual 
enforcement of constitutional norms is hardly free of conceptual or 
practical difficulties, it does provide a mechanism for a more di­
verse and robust consideration of the meaning and application of 
our nation’s core norms, an advantage that should not be discarded 
out of hand.54 
2. Primacy Approach 
The intuitive alternative to lockstep interpretation is to con­
sider a state’s constitution as the primary source of constitutional 
protection for its citizens.  When responding to a claimed constitu­
180-82.  Florida went so far as to amend its constitution to require that its search-and­
seizure provision “be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 12; see Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doc­
trine: Case-By-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1499 (2005)  [hereinafter State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine] 
(discussing this approach and the question of whether such lockstepping should bind a 
state to future Supreme Court interpretations of federal cognates of state constitutional 
provisions). 
50. TARR, supra note 6, at 180-85. R 
51. Id. 
52. It is easy to overstate these claims.  If the status of a constitutional decision as 
law depends on its appearance as such, it seems a fragile claim to legitimacy. 
53. See, e.g., Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1254 (pointing out that R 
states are “subnational units . . . partly dependent and partly independent; partly auton­
omous and partly subordinate[, with the] subnational unit’s autonomy [possibly] re­
stricted territorially or by area of competence, or both”). 
54. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 1181-86 (noting early on in the onset R 
of state constitutionalism the potential for state-court contributions to constitutional 
jurisprudence); State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 49 R 
passim. 
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tional violation arising from a state constitutional provision and its 
federal cognate, primacists argue that a state court should begin 
with the state’s version of that provision and employ an interpretive 
approach similar to that which has developed in federal constitu­
tional interpretation.55  Only if the state provision does not support 
the claimed constitutional protection should the state court turn to 
the federal provision.56  After all, the reasoning goes, incorporated 
federal protections are back-ups that are meant only to supply a 
corrective if state law is under-protective.57  To turn first to the fed­
eral constitution puts the cart before the horse, which improperly 
subordinates the state constitution and undercuts its development 
in a system of federalism premised on parallel constitutional 
protections.58 
If lockstepping is too top-down, leaving too little room for 
state constitutional development, this primacy alternative seems too 
bottom-up, over-emphasizing the role of state constitutionalism in 
our system of overlapping constitutional protections.  Given states’ 
subordinate status in our nation’s political structure, a state court’s 
interpretation of a common normative protection that lies at the 
heart of our national political values should start, both logically and 
conceptually, with the federal constitution,59 which presumptively 
sets the national standard.  The idea that a state court should in­
stead start with its own constitution, the federal constitution serving 
only as a back-up, must ultimately rest on the view that each state is 
an independent sovereignty, a political co-equal of the nation of 
which it is a part, and thus that its constitution must predominate 
within its borders, limited only by the Supremacy Clause’s positive 
command that applicable federal law cannot be ignored.60  As Pro­
fessor Gardner puts it, while there is room in our federal system for 
interpretive difference, that is different than full independence.61 
55. TARR, supra note 6, at 184-85. R 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. An early proponent of this primacy theory of interpretation is Professor Hans 
Linde, formerly the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court. See Linde, supra note 
6, at 396; TARR, supra note 6, at 183-84. R 
59. See Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1255 (arguing that “the partial R 
subordinancy of states in a federal system” significantly limits a “state polity’s agency, 
[a] limitation[ ] that [is] severely in tension with the premises of constitutional positiv­
ism, especially the requirement of political self-construction”).  Simply and obviously 
put, states in our federal system are not independent sovereignties with the political 
capacity for full self-governance. 
60. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 84. R 
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There is a practical side to this point as well.  When a litigant 
claims constitutional protection founded in both the state and fed­
eral constitutions, there is no need to go further if the federal provi­
sion provides the claimed protection.62  The federal Due Process 
Clause that binds the state requires recognition of the claim. The 
question of whether the state constitution’s protection is less than, 
the same, or greater than that provided by the federal constitution 
is quite beside the point, in a word, moot.  Moreover, federal consti­
tutional doctrine is in all likelihood better developed than its state 
counterpart,63 a practical reason to start at this point rather than 
beginning at some less developed point in state law. Finally, if the 
constitutional issue raised by a claim is unresolved as a federal mat­
ter, the state court has the opportunity to participate and be heard 
in the development of the federal standard, not as a sideline critic 
but as a court duty-bound to interpret and apply the federal consti­
tution.64  It is thus not surprising that the primacy approach has not 
attracted many adherents among state courts.65 
62. See TARR, supra note 6, at 14. R 
63. As noted, the rights revolution of the Warren Court basically overwhelmed 
the states, leading the way in developing a considerable body of constitutional doctrine 
in this area of cognate rights. See supra Part I.  State courts became accustomed to 
following that lead, respectively developing their own precedent concerning federal 
rights. See Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, R 
at 920. 
64. It is critically important that state courts remain engaged in this area of the 
interpretation and application of federal constitutional law. The availability of federal 
post-conviction relief has become so narrow that state courts have become critically 
important for considering federal constitutional claims in criminal cases tried in state 
courts. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006) (limiting federal habeas corpus review of state-court proceedings to 
decisions on the merits that violated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court” or that were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”); see also Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (essentially limiting federal habeas corpus review of asserted 
state-court constitutional errors to violations of constitutional principles prevailing at 
the time the conviction became final); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 362 (2000) 
(making it clear that Teague’s  limitation of federal habeas corpus review to principles 
prevailing at the time of conviction equated to AEDPA’s “clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). 
65. Oregon, perhaps understandably, as well as Maine and New Hampshire are 
among the courts that have taken this approach to interpreting their respective constitu­
tions.  See TARR, supra note 6, at 184 n.39.  The Supreme Judicial Court has at times R 
claimed allegiance to the primacy approach, but not on any consistent basis. Compare 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 434 (2000) (“As a general rule in decid­
ing . . . questions [of search-and-seizure rights], we look first to any applicable statutes, 
then to our State Constitution (if argued separately), and only if necessary to the Fed­
eral Constitution.”), with Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 199-200 (Mass. 
2005) (looking first to federal law before turning to state law to find the basis for the 
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3. Supplemental or Interstitial Approach 
Most states have taken a middle ground between lockstep­
ping’s automatic deference to the federal constitution and primacy’s 
relegation of it to a secondary role, an approach called by some 
“supplemental,” by others “interstitial.”66  In this approach, the 
state court looks first to the federal version of the cognate provi­
sion, and turns only to the state version if the federal provision does 
not afford the asserted protection.67 
This approach of examining the meaning and application of 
common fundamental norms first from the federal perspective 
strikes the right balance in our federal system.  Its relegation of 
state law to an interstitial role may at first seem troubling because 
state law only comes into play when the federal right does not pro­
vide the claimed protection, which may create the impression that 
the turn to the state constitution was driven by disagreement with 
the Supreme Court more than anything else.68  This appearance of 
result-oriented jurisprudence is exacerbated by the resulting body 
of state-constitutional law, which due to its limited, interstitial use 
may turn out to be a relatively narrow, disconnected set of prece­
dents that quite often reflect policy disagreements with contrary Su­
preme Court decisions,69 effectively over-ruling those federal 
decisions within that state.70 
claimed right); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 176-77 (Mass. 2000) 
(same); Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-93 (Mass. 1992) (same). See 
generally Grasso, supra note 9 (demonstrating that notwithstanding its claim to the pri- R 
macy approach in Rodriguez, the Supreme Judicial Court often employs the supple­
mental approach in addressing search-and-seizure issues under Article 14). 
66. See TARR, supra note 6, at 182-83. R 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., id. at 183; In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1044, R 
1047-49, 1063. 
69. Of course, this is not necessarily so.  To be sure, under this approach the court 
will not, or at least should not, consider the state’s constitution if the federal provision 
provides the claimed relief.  But even if the court does turn to the state provision be­
cause the federal version of the right provides no relief, the court may determine that 
the state right is no more protective than the federal cognate. This alignment of the 
state version of the norm with its federal counterpart, called by some “reflective adop­
tion,” see, e.g., State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 49, at R 
1506-08, is properly a part of the supplemental approach unless one assumes that a state 
court that interprets its own constitution does so only if it is bent on rights expansion. 
This is not lockstep if that term means, as it suggests, necessarily tethering the state 
version of a norm to its federal cognate. 
70. See, e.g., Hans Linde, E Pluribus–Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 
GA. L. REV. 165, 178 (1984); In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1047­
49. 
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In an apparent effort to avoid this impression of decisional ille­
gitimacy, some state courts have gone out of their way to identify 
the independent bases on which their state-constitutional decisions 
rest.  This interpretive approach typically parallels federal constitu­
tional analysis by examining the text of the provision and intent of 
its framers as well as the state’s precedents, history, and unique tra­
ditions or political values to find support for a decision that the 
state provision is different and offers broader protection than its 
federal counterpart.71  Some courts have even developed specific 
criteria to guide their divergence from federal precedent in an ef­
fort to avoid the temptations—or the appearance—of result-ori­
ented decision making.72 
This is overcompensation that is not only unnecessary but 
doomed to failure.73  There may be principled reasons for a state 
court to find different, more protective meaning for a common 
norm and to impose its version of that norm within its state, but it is 
almost never because the state and federal provisions have signifi­
cantly different text74 or distinct intellectual and historical roots. 
71. See TARR, supra note 6, at 183 & n.36; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. R 
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000) (citing differing text and history of the 
Fifth Amendment and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights as a justification for 
broader reading of Article 12’s protection against compelled self-incrimination). 
72. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concur­
ring) (setting out the following seven factors to measure the legitimacy of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court relying on its state constitution supplementally to expand rights 
recognized in both the federal and state constitutions: (1) textual language; (2) legisla­
tive history; (3) pre-existing state law; (4) structural differences; (5) matters of particu­
lar state interest or local concern; (6) state traditions; and (7) public attitudes); see also 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 & n.7 (Pa. 1991); State v. Gunwall, 720 
P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986); In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1046­
55 (criticizing the criteria approach as subordinating state constitutions to the federal 
constitution). 
73. See James Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 761 (1992). 
74. There are, of course, some textual differences—even in constitutions that pre­
date the federal constitution—that convey different meaning. For example, Article 12 
of the Declaration or Rights provides not just for the right to confront a prosecution 
witness in a criminal trial, but the right for “face-to-face” confrontation, thus explicitly 
providing for more protection than does the Sixth Amendment. Compare Common­
wealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 660-62 (Mass. 1997) (holding that Article 12’s ex­
plicit requirement of “face-to-face” confrontation requires just that and that a 
courtroom seating arrangement which at best permitted the defendant to see only the 
profiles of child witnesses whom he was accused of raping violated that requirement), 
with Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50, 857 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amend­
ment does not in every case require face-to-face confrontation and that where necessary 
to protect a child witness from trauma its absence does not violate the Sixth Amend­
ment’s confrontation clause). 
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That is certainly so in a state like Massachusetts, whose Declaration 
of Rights served as a model for the federal Bill of Rights.75  Even in 
states with less direct ties between their respective constitutions and 
the federal cognate, resting different meaning on a claim of distinct 
language, history, and intellectual roots is an empty claim. We are, 
after all, the same people, and regional differences—ideological 
and otherwise—have all but disappeared in the face of the ever-
increasing mobility and homogenation of our society.76  When this 
cultural and political convergence is coupled with the fact that the 
rights provisions of the federal and the various state constitutions 
generally have common historical and intellectual roots, articulating 
common, national norms, the idea that—based on the conventional 
interpretive tools of text, history, and fundamental values—a rights 
provision of a state constitution might be sufficiently distinct from 
75. Even so, the Supreme Judicial Court seems on occasion to suggest this inde­
pendence as a basis for its state-constitutional decision making. See, e.g., Mavredakis, 
725 N.E.2d at 178 (citing the differing language and history of the Fifth Amendment 
and Article 12 as one of the justifications for more broadly reading Article 12’s protec­
tion against compelled self-incrimination than that of the Fifth Amendment). See gen­
erally Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Has Interpreted its State Constitution to Address 
Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (2004).  Then-Justice, now Chief 
Justice Ireland’s review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretive methodology in 
state constitutionalism describes a supplemental approach utilizing the conventional in­
terpretive tools of history, text, precedent, and policy judgments informed by distinct 
regional history and culture. Id. But see Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Decla­
ration of Rights, supra note 9, at 889-91 (describing an early methodology, a supplemen- R 
tal approach characterized by “a strong tradition of judicial restraint” exhibiting 
deference both to “the lead of the United States Supreme Court” and particularly “leg­
islative determinations”) and cases cited and described. 
In a review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s state-constitution jurisprudence twenty 
years later, Justice Wilkins described a court more willing to disagree with its national 
counterpart (particularly on Fourth Amendment issues), relying on 
[progressive state] traditions and a state Constitution that expresses concepts
 
of reasonableness and fairness that should be reapplied as society changes . . .
 
[to] justif[y] an independent and different conclusion on a constitutional issue
 
by judges who are sworn to uphold not only the United States Constitution
 
but also the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
 
Herbert P. Wilkins, The State Constitution Matters, 44 BOSTON B. J. 4, 17 (Dec. 2000) 
[hereinafter The State Constitution Matters]. 
76. It is not that we cannot tell one strip mall from another as we drive cross-
country or that our local broadcasters all speak with the same accent, but that the dual 
identity of state and federal citizenry long ago blurred, leaving the cultural and political 
constant that we are not Virginians, Californians. or Arkansans, but Americans who 
might live in Virginia, California, or Arkansas.  This disappearance of any felt cultural 
and ideological autonomy of the states—that a state is constituted in a way that is fun­
damentally different than the rest of the nation—has contributed to the erosion of via­
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the similar provision of the federal constitution to be interpreted 
differently seems nothing short of a fantasy.77  Professor James 
Gardner calls this analytic approach the “[d]ead [e]nd of [r]omantic 
[s]ubnationalism,”78 and that seems a fair assessment. 
In our federal system, state constitutionalism must be intersti­
tial, its proper role being to supplement the protection provided by 
the federal version of our nation’s basic norms.79  The state-consti­
tutional law that develops can never be the seamless comprehensive 
doctrine characteristic of an independent sovereignty’s constitu­
tional jurisprudence, nor should it be.  In this area of constitutional 
overlap, state-constitutional law is by nature a gap-filler, a correc­
tive, not a primary source of constitutional protection. When, then, 
is such gap-filling, such correction appropriate and when is defer­
ence to the content of the federal norm the better course? This, of 
course, is Dean Sager’s question, which we can now attempt to 
answer. 
C. The Operative Content of Appropriate Deference 
Asking when deference is appropriate recognizes, of course, 
that federal supremacy over the states does not require unfailing 
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the mean­
ing and application of a fundamental national norm.80  That is so 
even though, as developed above, conventional constitutional anal­
ysis, with its focus on text, history, and ideological context, helps 
little here due to the substantial identity of the state and federal 
norms in question.  But that underlying identity of norms does not 
compel the conclusion that two related versions, even textually 
identical versions, of a particular norm must yield a consensus as to 
its meaning in every context and application. These are purposely 
spacious, indeterminate mandates—here, freedom from unreasona­
ble searches and seizures, the right to counsel in a criminal prosecu­
tion—that are fairly subject to more than one interpretation. 
Common words and history do not necessarily dictate common 
meaning.  That said, our interpretive context is not a philosophical 
inquiry in which we write on a blank tablet.  Rather, this interpre­
tive effort occurs in a settled political construct in which the fifty 
states are not independent sovereignties but constituent parts of a 
77. See  INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 53-79. R 
78. Id. at 53. 
79. Sager, supra note 1, at 973-76. R 
80. Id. at 973. 
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sovereign nation.  On what principled basis, then, may a state court 
decline to defer to the Supreme Court concerning the meaning of 
such a basic norm? 
1.	 State Courts as “Agents of Federalism,” Monitoring the 
Supreme Court 
One approach would be to acknowledge state-court policy-
based dissonance concerning the meaning and reach of common 
norms and to embrace it as a healthy aspect of the unique state-
nation relationship inherent in our federal system.81  Professor 
Gardner advances this position, arguing that the federal system, 
with its overlapping state and federal authority, has as its primary 
purpose the protection of its citizens’ liberty.82  In effect, Professor 
Gardner argues, the national and state governments act as monitors 
of one another, each designed to resist instances of potential over­
reaching by its respective counterpart.83  In this view, state courts 
are supposed to interpret state law, including state constitutions, to 
resist the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a cognate federal pro­
vision if the state court concludes that the federal interpretation of 
the norm could result in an undue assertion of governmental power 
within the state.84 
This approach turns the apparent vice of independent state 
constitutional analysis into its principal virtue.  Recognizing that 
conventional state constitutional analysis is a doomed enterprise, 
providing thin cover for what at bottom is a policy difference with 
the Supreme Court concerning the meaning or reach of a common 
norm, Professor Gardner embraces such policy-based resistance as 
a viable tool for state courts to use in their role as watch dogs 
(“agents of federalism” in his words)85 protecting the people 
against national government overreaching.86  The overlapping but 
potentially disparate rights-protection by the state and national 
81.	 INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 18-19. R 
82. Id.  Some have taken issue with this description of federalism, arguing that it 
is unduly narrow. See Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 
211, 226-28 (2008).  That may be, but in the area of criminal procedure it seems an apt 
construct. 
83.	 INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 18-19. R 
84.	 Id. at 181-82. 
85.	 Id. at 186-87. 
86.	 Id. 
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governments in this view operates as a vertical system of checks and 
balances, protecting the liberty interests of the people.87 
This is an elegant construct and does much to address the con­
cerns for decisional legitimacy that haunt state constitutional analy­
sis.  But it does so by recognizing a presumption that state courts 
have open-ended authority to enhance fundamental normative pro­
tections through the state constitution to protect the liberty inter­
ests of the state’s citizens.  In effect, this presumes away the 
subordinate status of states in this area of conflicting state and fed­
eral interpretations of common normative values.  As Professor 
Gardner concedes, state courts do not have a general mandate in 
our federal system to engage in unfettered oversight of the Su­
preme Court and thus to construct a competing constitutional com­
mon law.88  The authority of the state court so to act must be 
grounded in state law,89 likely the constitution of the state in 
question. 
But, as Professor Gardner acknowledges, no state constitution 
explicitly authorizes its courts to overrule the Supreme Court con­
cerning the breadth of a particular right articulated in both the fed­
eral and state constitutions.90  He further concedes that some state 
constitutions may authorize a judicial role that is too narrow to per­
mit this sort of activism, a narrowness perhaps founded in distrust 
of judicial decision making that is apparent from the text, history, 
or other tools of constitutional construction.91  Gardner bases this 
presumed state court authority on the central role that courts play 
in the liberty maximization lying at the heart of our federal sys­
tem.92  This aspect of judicial review, he argues, is so integral to our 
constitutional system that one who would deny that role for a par­
87. Id. at 195-98.  Although the focus of this Article is individual rights, Professor 
Gardner does not limit this notion of checks and balances to rights protection but ex­
tends it to structural issues as well. Id. at 187-94. 
88. Id. at 181-82. 
89. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).  A state legislature could, 
of course, enact a statute providing greater protection to individuals than does a federal 
constitutional provision, but a legislature has undoubted political authority to speak for 
the state’s citizens in that regard. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2008) (limit­
ing the scope of a search incident to arrest to “fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and 
other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its 
destruction or concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to 
resist arrest or effect his escape”). 
90. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 228-29. R 
91. Id. at 245-53. 
92. Id. at 243-45. 
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ticular state court has the burden to show that the state’s constitu­
tion forbids it.93 
This presumption reorders the nation-state relationship. Infer­
ior state courts become the presumptive final arbiters of the mean­
ing and scope of fundamental national norms, potentially 
balkanizing the meaning and scope of the normative boundaries 
that lie at the heart of our common political values. This reordering 
becomes all the more clear when one asks, on what basis should a 
state court exercise its presumed prerogative as an agent of federal­
ism to expand a common, core right within its state?  Professor 
Gardner would leave it to the state court, acting as a presumptive 
agent of federalism, to identify those Supreme Court decisions that 
unduly threaten a particular individual right to be free of govern­
mental interference.  As attractive as Professor Gardner’s answer to 
Dean Sager’s question may seem, in the end it affords too much 
open-ended discretion to state courts, coming close to reducing the 
Supreme Court to just another supreme court. 
2. Presumption of Uniform Meaning 
Rather than presuming, as Professor Gardner does, the across­
the-board legitimacy of state court expansions of our core norma­
tive protections in the name of liberty maximization, a norm-spe­
cific approach makes more sense.  The nation’s supremacy over its 
constituent parts justifies starting with a presumption of state-court 
deference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fundamental 
norms, but this presumption should give way when state-by-state 
adjustments of particular fundamental norms is consistent both con­
ceptually and practically with our federal construct. 
In deciding when that is so, one must begin with the underlying 
constitutional interests at stake.  All criminal-procedure protections 
ultimately protect liberty, which as Ronald Dworkin puts it, “is that 
part of freedom that government would do wrong to restrain.”94 
But the liberty interests respectively protected by the search-and­
93. Id.  Justice Wilkins in his more recent review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
state constitutional jurisprudence, would find such a mandate in what he calls the 
[progressive state] traditions and a state Constitution that expresses concepts 
of reasonableness and fairness that should be reapplied as society changes . . . 
[to] justif[y] an independent and different conclusion on a constitutional issue 
by judges who are sworn to uphold not only the United States Constitution 
but also the Constitution of the Commonwealth. 
The State Constitution Matters, supra note 75, at 17. R 
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seizure and right-to-counsel norms are different not only in content 
but in kind.  Take the right to counsel.95  It does not stake out a 
particular activity—a “freedom” in Dworkin’s terms—“that [the] 
government would do wrong to restrain.”96  Rather, along with fa­
miliar rights such as the right of a criminally accused to a jury trial 
and to confront witnesses against him, it offers procedural protec­
tion against wrongful conviction97 and the loss of personal freedom, 
a cognizable liberty interest, that would ensue.  My argument is that 
these sorts of procedural protections, imposed on the states both 
through the federal Bill of Rights98 and through state constitutions, 
generally overcome the presumption of state-court deference to the 
Supreme Court. 
State constitutional expansion of a procedural protection such 
as the right to counsel works no change on the nation’s normative 
boundary that marks out constitutional liberties and protects them 
from governmental restraint. The protected liberty interest is free­
dom from conviction and imprisonment without due process, that 
is, wrongful conviction, and that core interest is, if anything, ratified 
rather than disturbed by enhancing such procedural protections. 
Further, these procedural rights are integrally tied to the adjudica­
tive process and thus are essentially local in their impact, having full 
effect within but none beyond a state’s court system. The state thus 
has exclusive dominion and control over these normative protec­
tions, giving it a strong claim to the political autonomy that is the 
conceptual predicate to their constitutional construction by its 
courts. 
95. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecu­
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also People v. Cain, 556 N.E. 2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 
1990) (defendants have “a right to be present, with counsel, at all material stages of a 
trial”). 
96. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 471. 
97. Here I use “wrongful conviction” to mean a conviction inconsistent with due 
process, not conviction of an innocent.  Though conviction of an innocent would surely 
be wrongful as a moral matter, to date at least, the Supreme Court has yet to hold that 
there is a substantive due process right to an acquittal if one is innocent. Whether so 
confining due process in this context to procedural protections is “right” or not is be­
yond the scope of this Article.  I will proceed on what I understand is the current state 
of normative protections in this area to be, that is, wholly procedural. 
98. This is admittedly an overstatement, but not by much. The Eight Amend­
ment’s right to a grand jury has not been incorporated, see Hurtado v. California, 110 
U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884), nor has the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury ver­
dict, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35, n.13 (2010).  However, 
the rest of the safeguards designed to protect against wrongful convictions have been 
incorporated and are thus applicable to the states. 
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From a prudential standpoint, this inherent connection to the 
adjudicative process supports the decisional legitimacy of the 
courts—based on institutional competence and expertise—in gaug­
ing the effectiveness of such norms in protecting against a wrongful 
conviction.  Moreover, judges insulated from the political process 
are likely in the best position to fairly assess the procedural protec­
tions afforded to those accused of crimes, a cohort that does not 
typically enjoy much political support.99 
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court,100 decided 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2004, illustrates the 
point.  There the Supreme Judicial Court held under Article 12 of 
the Declaration of Rights that the right to counsel requires not only 
the presence of counsel at bail and detention hearings,101 but more 
broadly the appointment and presence of counsel in every criminal 
case by or reasonably soon after arraignment.102  In so holding, the 
court went beyond Supreme Court interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment concerning the reach of the right to counsel, and an 
examination of the court’s analysis demonstrates that this lack of 
interpretive deference was wholly justified.103 
The Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretive approach did not 
rest on differing text or history of the two provisions.  Like many 
cognate constitutional provisions, both the Sixth Amendment and 
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide for 
this normative protection in essentially identical terms.104  That is 
no surprise because the Declaration of Rights served as a model for 
the Bill of Rights.105  For its part, the Supreme Court has inter­
preted the federal version of this right to provide for clear but spare 
normative baselines, holding, most notably in Gideon v. Wain­
wright, that indigent persons accused of crimes, at least those in­
volving any likelihood of incarceration, are entitled to 
99. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 39, at 1709 (asserting “that courts are likely to R 
have a perspective that may make them more sensitive than legislatures to some possi­
ble rights violations” due in part to “judges’ professional training and mission [that] 
involves a solicitude for rights as they have historically been understood”). 
100. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004). 
101. Id. at 900-01. 
102. Id. at 903. 
103. Id. 
104. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecu­
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Article 12, in pertinent part, provides: “[a]nd every 
subject [held to answer for any crime or offense] shall have a right . . . to be fully heard 
in his defence by himself, or his council, at his election.”  MASS. CONST. art. XII. 
105. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. R 
105 
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representation by appointed counsel.106  While the Court went on 
to hold that the Sixth Amendment requires not just counsel in some 
formal sense, but effective assistance of counsel,107 it is fair to say 
that the Court has not been aggressive in expanding the right to 
counsel, leaving plenty of “untiled space,” to return to Dean Sager’s 
expression, beyond these baselines. 
This minimalist approach may well have been intentional, de­
ferring to the states as a matter of comity to round out the protec­
tion as best makes sense in the particular context of each state’s 
adjudicative procedures.  Over thirty years ago, Dean Sager argued 
that such purposeful under-enforcement of constitutional norms by 
the Supreme Court is appropriate for institutional reasons, includ­
ing comity, leaving it for the states to expand, or not, these norma­
tive protections.108  That may lay behind the relatively thin texture 
of the Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence. 
The Court has thus held under the Sixth Amendment that 
while the right to counsel attaches when the prosecution begins,109 
the right does not entitle an accused to the appointment—much less 
the presence and advice—of counsel until a “critical stage” of the 
proceedings.110  According to the Court, such “critical stages” of 
the proceedings are those “that amount to ‘trial-like confronta­
tions,’ at which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal 
problems or . . . meeting his adversary.’”111  While it is surely true 
that counsel’s presence and advice during such adversarial confron­
tations is critical, limiting counsel’s role to such confrontations ig­
nores the equally important role that counsel plays in developing an 
effective defense.  Yet, that is where the Court left the matter. 
What if a state court, as a matter of cost-saving or necessity, 
does not appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants until 
well after arraignment?  Is arraignment or the period that follows 
arraignment a “critical stage” requiring the presence of an ap­
106. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). 
107. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986); Strickland v. Wash­
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
108. See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con­
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221, 1248 (1978) [hereinafter Fair Measure]. 
109. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (holding the right to coun­
sel attaches when “a prosecution is commenced”); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972) (holding that a prosecution is commenced “at . . . the initiation of adversary 
judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment”). 
110. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 211-13 (2008). 
111. Id. at 212 n.16 (internal citations omitted). 
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pointed attorney?  If it is, does the failure to appoint counsel during 
that period violate an indigent accused’s right to counsel categori­
cally or only upon a showing of actual harm? These are questions 
that the Supreme Court has left open under the Sixth Amend­
ment,112 and they lay at the heart of Lavallee. 
In the run-up to Lavallee, the Massachusetts Superior Court 
sitting in Hampden County found itself with an insufficient number 
of qualified lawyers willing to accept indigent appointments due to 
what all agreed was a very low rate of legislatively authorized com­
pensation.113  As a result, many unrepresented “indigent . . . de­
fendants . . . [were] held [preventively] or in lieu of bail,” and they 
petitioned for declarative relief authorizing the trial courts to order 
compensation at a higher rate, one which would attract qualified 
lawyers in sufficient numbers to provide assistance of counsel to 
indigent defendants at the early stages of the proceedings.114  Of 
course, any such declarative relief would rest on a right to counsel 
that substantively entitled Lavallee and his fellow petitioners to 
such representation. 
In its ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on Article 12 to 
enhance the federal protection limned by the Supreme Court, hold­
ing that irrespective of any showing of actual harm, the right to 
counsel requires not only the presence of counsel at any bail or 
preventive detention hearing115 but more broadly the appointment 
and presence of counsel in every case by, or reasonably soon after, 
arraignment.116  This state constitutional expansion of the right to 
counsel was both theoretically and prudentially appropriate. 
112. Id. at 212 (reaffirming that the right to counsel attaches at arraignment, de­
fined there as the defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate, but declining fur­
ther to decide whether arraignment is a “critical stage” requiring the presence of 
counsel or, if it is, whether the criminal defendant must show harm in order to claim a 
violation if counsel was not then present). 
113. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 899-900 
(Mass. 2004). 
114. Id. at 900. 
115. Id. at 903. 
116. Id. at 903-06.  The court declined to authorize the requested increase in at­
torney compensation, principally out of respect for the separation of powers and the 
legislature’s appropriation authority. Id. at 907-09.  While urging the executive and leg­
islative branches to craft a permanent solution, as interim relief, the court ordered that 
“on a showing that no counsel is available to represent a particular . . . defendant de­
spite good faith efforts, such a defendant may not be held more than seven days and the 
criminal case against such a defendant may not continue beyond forty-five days.” Id. at 
901. 
The court could have grounded its holding in the Sixth Amendment, in effect flesh­
ing out the federal version of this common, fundamental normative protection. The 
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First, the state court’s refinement of this procedural right did 
not disturb the national contours of constitutional liberty. The lib­
erty interest at stake was avoiding wrongful conviction, and the 
court’s intent was explicitly to protect that interest in the context of 
the state’s procedures for adjudicating criminal cases.117  So, the 
court’s unequivocal requirement that counsel be present through­
out the post-arraignment stage of the process, even though under 
the federal version of the right this may not be a “critical stage” 
requiring such presence, was explicitly a function of Massachusetts 
procedure and the issues under that procedural system that an ac­
cused is required to address.118  The court pointed out that under 
Massachusetts’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant must file 
a pretrial conference report within twenty-one days of arraign­
ment.119  In this report a defendant sets forth his decisions on criti­
cal issues such as whether to present particular defenses and 
memorializes his and the prosecution’s respective discovery obliga­
tions.  Further, within seven days of filing the conference report,120 
a defendant must decide which pretrial-motions if any he wishes to 
file and then draft and file them.121  Each of these steps is critically 
important to mounting an effective defense, and the advice of coun­
sel, founded on a full investigation and understanding of the case, 
seems here essential. 
As a matter of decisional autonomy, there could not be a more 
state-specific normative protection than the right to counsel, at least 
that part of the right that affects the post-investigation adjudication 
of a criminal case.122  Its impact is by definition confined to the 
court is surely authorized, indeed obligated where necessary to resolve a claim, to inter­
pret and apply that federal constitutional provision, but it chose instead to decide the 
case under Article 12’s right-to-counsel provision.  While the Sixth Amendment would 
have given the court a voice in the development of the federal right, given the nature of 
the claims, the need for finality, and the potential implications for the coordinate 
branches of government, it seems a better choice for the court to have founded its 
decision in state-constitutional law. 
117. Id. (stating that the deprivation “resulted in severe restrictions on their lib­
erty and other constitutional interests”). 




122. There is another aspect to this right, which is providing an interface, once 
criminal proceedings have begun, for meeting and communicating with the accused’s 
adversary, i.e., the government. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 
(1964).  As to this aspect of the right to counsel, where the normative protections ex­
tend beyond the courtroom and its procedures, the state-constitutional analysis may be 
a little different. 
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state’s pretrial, trial, and post-trial proceedings;123 it has no impact 
on the similar proceedings of federal courts within the state or the 
courts of other states.  And, there is no doubt that the state through 
its courts can implement an enhanced version of this normative pro­
tection, forcing, if necessary, its state actors—prosecutors, police of­
ficers, and so on—to comply.  Given the confinement of the right to 
counsel to a state and its actors coupled with the state’s ability to 
enforce the right’s protective mandate on those actors, states 
through their courts have the sovereign autonomy that is a predi­
cate to constitutional construction of the right to counsel under 
their respective state constitutions. 
From a prudential perspective, the court’s experience and ex­
pertise in the adjudication of criminal cases and its institutional pre­
rogative to superintend this process seem beyond question,124 thus 
supporting its claim to institutional competence and decisional le­
gitimacy in crafting this state constitutional enhancement of the 
right-to-counsel protections.125  And, while the national template 
for this right was, and remains, open to similar development, it is 
not clear that it should be, given the jurisdiction-specific reasons for 
the court’s carefully crafted and quite particular holding.126  Per­
haps it is better to leave such filling-in of this “untiled” constitu­
tional space to each state, with the national version of the norm 
123. See, e.g., Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 901. 
124. In this regard, it seems worth noting that the justice who wrote the decision, 
Justice Francis Spina, was particularly well suited to the task, having served as a prose­
cutor and criminal defense attorney for many years prior to his appointment to the 
bench.  Supreme Judicial Court, Francis X. Spina, Mass.gov (Mar. 1, 2011, 1:30pm), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/justices/spina.html.  He also served as a Superior Court 
judge, where he presided over many, many criminal cases, before his appointment first 
to the Commonwealth’s Appeals Court and then to the Supreme Judicial Court. Id.  If  
anyone understands how the Massachusetts criminal justice process works, it is Justice 
Spina. 
125. One might complain that the court should have utilized the less drastic and 
more mutable powers of superintendence to accomplish this result. There is often 
much to be said for such institutional self-restraint in judicial decision making, leaving 
open a role for the legislature and a door for future adjustment if future conditions 
suggest it. See, e.g., Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra 
note 9, at 889.  However, this particular case, rubbing up against the legislative appro- R 
priation prerogative while implicating the core of the fundamental right-to-counsel pro­
tection, called out for a definitive resolution, and the state-constitutional basis for the 
decision seems entirely appropriate.  If the state actors with the direct power to craft a 
permanent solution to this problem held back, the court had staked out the basis for a 
more direct and drastic remedy. 
126. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 901. 
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providing its broad baselines.127  However that question may be an­
swered, the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Lavallee illustrates 
why independent state constitutionalism can make sense even when 
the protection in question is a fundamental norm common to both 
the state’s and the nation’s constitutions. 
So, too, it would seem for other rights that offer procedural 
protections for the individual liberty interest in avoiding wrongful 
conviction and incarceration, at least those rights such as the right 
to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses, which provide 
their respective procedural protections once the criminal proceed­
ing has begun.  Each such right is confined in its effect to the state’s 
adjudicative process, which is a sector of the state’s governmental 
processes about which the courts have an undoubted claim to ex­
pertise and decisional legitimacy and over which they exercise full 
control.  As to these fundamental rights, the presumption of inter­
pretive deference to the Supreme Court is overcome, and state con­
stitutional expansion of their protection is appropriate. 
The same cannot be said for the Fourth Amendment’s and Ar­
ticle 14’s norm protecting against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  For reasons both conceptual and prudential, the presump­
tion of national uniformity should hold in this situation, counseling 
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the content 
of this normative protection. 
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
not a procedural right that protects an underlying liberty interest. 
The norm itself marks the boundary between freedom from particu­
lar investigative intrusions and constitutionally permissible law en­
forcement conduct.  While enhancing a procedural right such as the 
right to counsel marks no change in the contours of our nation’s 
core liberties, any adjustment to the search-and-seizure balance 
changes the normative boundary that defines the respective liberty 
and governmental interests in this important area of governmental 
interface with its citizenry.  If a state court works such an adjust­
ment under its constitution, it does not just ratchet up the procedu­
127. I do not overlook that the Sixth Amendment provides the only constitu­
tional right-to-counsel protection in the federal courts.  But in limning its bounds, the 
Supreme Court presumably is mindful of the protections in this regard afforded by 
federal statutes and the federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are of course 
promulgated by the Court with the assent of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074 
(2006).  The Court can thus afford a minimalist approach to the constitutional protec­
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ral protection of an underlying liberty interest common to the states 
and the nation; it creates a different balance of constitutional inter­
ests within that state, giving rise to the possibility of a state-by-state 
patchwork of protection, drained of the normative force that na­
tional consensus provides.  Even if constitutional dissonance does 
not reach that level, state constitutional adjustments of the search­
and-seizure balance undercut the uniform meaning one would ex­
pect in a fundamental, national norm. 
From the perspective of decisional or sovereign autonomy, 
there is a serious question as to a state’s ability effectively to impose 
constitutionally enhanced search-and-seizure protection. The 
search-and-seizure protection is directed principally at governmen­
tal law enforcement, and both federal and state law-enforcement 
agents operate within each state, sometimes side-by-side, enforcing 
federal and state versions of what are essentially the same crimes.128 
When a state seeks to impose more demanding search-and-seizure 
protections, the overlapping system of dual law enforcement signifi­
cantly undercuts the force of such additional protections. Federal 
officers ordinarily are not bound by the state limits, even if the mat­
ter under investigation results in a state court prosecution.129  State 
officers are similarly not subject to more stringent state protections 
when they are a participating in a federal investigation, again even 
if the matter is ultimately tried in state court.130  And, of course, 
128. The facts underlying Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 
2009), discussed below, provide a typical example.  Connolly was convicted in Massa­
chusetts Superior Court of trafficking in cocaine (124.31 grams) in violation of MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32E(b)(3) (2008) (punishing possession of between 100 and 200 
grams of cocaine with intent to distribute by imprisonment for not less than ten years 
and not more than twenty years) and distribution of cocaine (three grams) in violation 
of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32A(c) (2008) (punishing distribution of cocaine in any 
amount by imprisonment for up to ten years). See Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 374.  Con­
nolly could have been charged and tried in federal court for the same conduct. See 21 
U.S.C. § 841A(a)(b)(1)(C) (2006) (punishing the distribution of cocaine in any amount 
and possession of cocaine in any amount with intent to distribute by imprisonment up 
to twenty years).  Under the respective state and federal statutes, not taking into ac­
count the respective sentencing guidelines in the two jurisdictions or applicable fines in 
each, Connolly thus faced thirty years in state prison and forty years in federal prison 
for the two counts.  In the event, he was prosecuted only in state court. See Connolly, 
913 N.E.2d at 360. 
129. See Commonwealth v. Cryer, 689 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1998) (general rule plus 
collective enterprise exception); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. 
1997) (same). 
130. See Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d at 458 (holding that absent a state-federal “com­
bined enterprise,” which had as its purpose bringing a state prosecution, in which “State 
officials retained more authority over the investigation,” or in which “[s]tate involve­
ment [had] been more substantial,” evidence seized in violation of Article 14 but consis­
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state constitutional protections are not recognized in federal court 
no matter who conducted the investigation,131 creating an opportu­
nity for forum shopping in those cases in which both federal and 
state law criminalize the conduct in question.  So, while a more de­
manding state version of the search-and-seizure norm would have 
considerable impact on criminal investigation practices in a state, 
the ability of both state and federal officers to opt out of the state’s 
more demanding search-and-seizure protection in investigating a 
broad range of cases—e.g., drug and gun cases in which searches 
and seizures are almost always employed—significantly reduces the 
state’s claim to constitutional autonomy with respect to this norm. 
Simply put, there is too much seepage, eroding the sovereign con­
trol of the norm on which interpretive autonomy must rest.132 
Commonwealth v. Connolly,133 a case recently decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court, serves as a useful example. At issue was 
whether police installation and monitoring  of a global positioning 
system (GPS) device on Connolly’s car constituted a “search” or a 
“seizure,” thus subjecting this investigative technique to the search­
and-seizure norm’s reasonableness requirement.134  The Supreme 
Judicial Court decided  as a state constitutional matter that such 
GPS surveillance  constituted a “seizure” of Connolly’s car and thus 
required a warrant to be  lawful.135 
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue,136 but it is 
entirely plausible that the Court, or until that happens, the First 
tent with the Fourth Amendment is not subject to exclusion in state prosecutions); see 
also Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 N.E.2d 845, 850-51 (Mass. 2010) (citing and reaf­
firming Gonzalez). 
131. See Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Some­
thing Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1445­
52 (2005) (criticizing this state-to-federal version of the silver platter doctrine). 
132. Others have made a related point, observing that the need for uniformity in 
federal law is not categorical but rather varies depending on the extent to which the 
norm and its likely violation is confined to single states or, alternatively, will involve 
“interstate spillovers.” See Michael Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1457, 1485 (2005) (citing and quoting RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND  REFORM 288-89 (1996)).  Although the spillovers that Solimine and 
Posner considered were geographic, the same point holds for spillovers within a state if 
the impact is on both state and federal actors. 
133. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 356. 
134. Id. at 366-67. 
135. Id. at 369-70.  The officers had obtained a warrant before installing and mon­
itoring the GPS device, and the court went on to hold that the warrant satisfied Article 
14’s reasonableness requirement. Id. at 371; see infra note 150. 
136. Id. at 367-68. 
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Circuit, will reach a different conclusion,137 deciding that this intru­
sion is neither a “search” nor a “seizure” under the Fourth Amend­
ment.  In that event, under federal law police officers would be free 
to install and to monitor these devices at their discretion,138 making 
the the state’s enhanced search-and-seizure protection139 depen­
dent on whether federal officers or state police install and monitor 
the GPS.  Indeed, even without any federal involvement, state of­
ficers who install a GPS and seize the drugs in a case like Connolly 
could hand the seized narcotics over to federal authorities for fed­
eral prosecution, thus shielding their surveillance from enhanced 
state-constitutional oversight.  Finally, if (as is often the case) such 
an investigation is conducted by a joint task force in which federal, 
state, and local officers work together, the GPS surveillance would 
remain beyond state-constitutional review even in state court if a 
state judge decides that the investigation was predominately fed­
eral.140  With so much potential for state and federal officers to 
evade the enhanced protection announced in Connolly, it is difficult 
to see the state as having the degree of sovereign independence 
from the nation to claim the search-and-seizure norm as a separate, 
state constitutional limitation on governmental power. 
From a prudential perspective, judgments concerning the 
meaning and reach of the search-and-seizure norm do not fit easily 
into the conventional model of judicial decision making.  Deciding 
whether any particular investigative intrusion is, first of all, a 
“search”—determined by assessing our society’s “reasonable ex­
pectation[s] of privacy”141—and, if it is, whether that intrusion 
marks a reasonable balance of the privacy and public-safety inter­
ests there implicated, boil down to open-ended, often empirically 
based policy judgments.  Such decision making seems a far cry from 
137. Indeed, a circuit split has developed on this issue, with the Seventh, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits holding that GPS installation and monitoring does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit holding that it does. Compare 
United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010), United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th 
Cir. 2007), with United States v. Maynard, 515 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
138. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609. 
139. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369-70. 
140. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Mass. 1997) (declin­
ing to apply Article 14’s more demanding standard to police conduct because the inves­
tigation in question was predominately federal, as opposed to a combined, state-federal 
investigation); see also United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987); 
People v. Coleman, 882 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 2008). 
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
accord Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 367. 
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the application of established and more neutral principles typically 
characteristic of judicial interpretation. 
Of course, judges can and should utilize policy in their decision 
making.  The problem here is that the interest balancing that is nec­
essarily a part of interpreting the search-and-seizure norm is a dif­
ferent sort of policy application than that required to flesh out a 
procedural protection such as the right to counsel.  In answering 
search-and-seizure claims, the decision maker is explicitly called on 
to make empirical judgments concerning the way society works,142 
and even more perilously, normative judgments concerning how it 
ought to work,143 and then to translate the resulting conclusions 
into a judgment of what constitutes a reasonable balance of the 
competing individual and collective interests involved.  Here, both 
for reasons of institutional competence and of political legitimacy, 
the political insulation of judges works against, not for, them as de­
cision makers. 
Policy judgments such as these are more characteristic of the 
legislative process than the adjudicative process, and elected legisla­
tors seem far better positioned than appointed judges to make these 
calls.144  That seems all the more so given that this interest balanc­
ing is inevitably a function of time and place, a point that seems 
confirmed by the search-and-seizure doctrinal shifts, for example, in 
responding to advancing technology during the past half-century or 
so.145  At the least, we ought to pause before embedding any partic­
142. Is there, objectively speaking, an actual expectation of privacy? See Katz, 
389 U.S. at 360-61. 
143. Is that expectation one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable 
or legitimate? Id. 
144. Because the executive branch is directly involved in the law enforcement 
process, I will take it as a given that it is not a candidate to strike this constitutional 
balance. 
145. The best, and in the end perhaps problematic, example is the Court’s shift to 
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz to define searches in the then-early 
years of telecommunications and related technologies. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  In reviewing the Supreme Court’s application of this test in 
deciding whether tracking a beeper constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Connolly noted that “the Court has relied on the level of 
sophistication of the particular electronic device, and the physical location from which 
the device transmitted its signal, to determine whether use of the device interferes with 
a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a search.” Connolly, 913 
N.E.2d at 367. 
This past term, the Supreme Court sounded this very note of caution in City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), a case in which the Court held that a city’s 
review of the contents of a city employee’s messages that were recorded on a city-issued 
communications device was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 2632-33. 
Every justice except Justice Scalia agreed that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating 
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ular balance of interests in what some have aptly called the “consti­
tutional calcification”146 that characterizes judicial constitutional 
interpretation. 
Using Connolly again as our example, to determine if installing 
and monitoring a GPS device constitutes a “search” of the car or its 
owner, a court must ask itself whether, empirically, people in our 
society expect their cars to be free of such devices and the monitor­
ing of movement that these devices enable, and, if so, whether nor­
matively that expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as 
reasonable.147  Alternatively, to determine if the intrusion consti­
tutes a “seizure” of the car, a court must ask whether this investiga­
tive technique constitutes “some meaningful interference with [the 
owner’s] possessory interests in [the car]”148 even though the owner 
would know nothing about the device and would retain full use of 
the automobile, an equally fact-bound and value-laden question.  If 
the installation and monitoring of the GPS device constitutes a 
“search” or a “seizure” of the car,149 the court must then ask under 
too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role 
in society has become clear.” Id. at 2629.  Comparing today’s world with that of Katz, 
when the justices felt comfortable looking “[to their] own . . . experience to conclude 
that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth,” the Court ob­
served that “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication and information trans­
mission” make it difficult to “predict[ ] how . . . privacy expectations will be shaped . . . 
or the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as rea­
sonable.” Id. 
146. Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes 
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1692-93 (2005) (referring to constitutional 
decisions immunized from legislative, or even subsequent judicial review, by virtue of 
their asserted constitutional foundation). 
147. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61.  As the Supreme Judicial Court put the ques­
tion before deciding not to answer it with respect to GPS surveillance, is there “an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable”? Connolly, 913 
N.E.2d at 367 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984)). 
148. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 367. 
149. Id. at 369 & n.13.  The court’s analysis of this issue was, it is fair to say, 
wholly policy-based.  The court began by observing that under Fourth Amendment 
principles, to constitute a “seizure” of Connolly’s car, the installation and monitoring of 
the GPS device to track the vehicle’s movements had to impose “some meaningful in­
terference” with Connolly’s possessory interest in the car. Id. at 367, 369.  In deciding 
this test was met notwithstanding Connolly’s continuing possession and unfettered use 
of the car, the court opined that “[t]he owner of property has a right to exclude it from 
‘all the world,’ and the police use [of the car to conduct surveillance] ‘infringes [on] that 
exclusionary right.’. . . [Such surveillance] is a seizure not by virtue of the technology 
employed, but because the police use private property (the vehicle) to obtain informa­
tion for their own purposes.” Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. 
at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  As authority, the court cited only Justices Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion in Karo, a case in which the Supreme Court held that police moni­
toring of a beeper that they had installed in a drum of chemicals prior to the defen­
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what circumstances would it be “reasonable” for the police to em­
ploy this investigative technique.150  These questions require bal­
ancing individual privacy interests against collective public-safety 
interests—both in some sense liberty interests151—and their an­
swers depend on the sort of policy considerations, grounded in time 
and space, that seem ill-suited for courts to decide in an adjudica­
tive context.  They are rather quintessentially legislative 
decisions.152 
The legislature is the governmental body elected to address 
such policy issues, and its decisions have political legitimacy and 
accountability that judicial decisions do not share.153  Moreover, the 
legislature has more appropriate tools to explore the practical 
ramifications of such an issue,154 freeing it from the narrow factual 
predicate of a judicial decision and allowing input of the citizenry 
that is missing from judicial decision making.  Public hearings, open 
debate, and voting by elected representatives would replace the re­
cord and briefs of the parties, perhaps augmented by amicus sub­
missions, followed by necessarily cloistered deliberation and 
decision making of appointed judges.  And, if due to conditions un­
dant’s purchase of the drum did not constitute either a search or a seizure as long as the 
drum remained in a public place, theoretically open to the view of the public. Karo, 468 
U.S. at 708, 713-14. 
150. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d.at 371.  Once the Supreme Judicial Court decided that 
the GPS installation and monitoring constituted a seizure requiring a warrant, it had 
further to decide whether a warrant issued under the common-law authority of the 
courts would suffice to satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness or 
whether instead the constitution requires one issued under a state statute, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2008), that limits execution of the warrant to a seven-day period 
following its issuance.  The court held that because the search authorized would not 
yield tangible property, the statutory provision—which did not mention GPS or similar 
devices but rather facially applied to search warrants for tangible property—is inappli­
cable to a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device. Id. 
151. See  INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 84. R 
152. Indeed, in the wake of the federal circuit split on the question of whether 
installation and monitoring of a GPS device constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Boston Globe lead editorial on September 2, 2010, admonished Con­
gress to step in and “impose reasonable guidelines on the use of high-tech surveillance 
without a warrant or probable cause.”  Editorial, Supreme Court, Congress Need New 
Rules for GPS Searches, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.boston.com/boston 
globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2010/09/02/supreme_court_congress_need_ 
new_rules_for_gps_searches/. 
153. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (explaining the constitutional 
role of legislatures: “[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to 
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976))). 
154. Included in this calculus would be the costs in confusion arising from the 
different standards. 
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foreseen or a sense based on subsequent experience that the deci­
sion was a mistake, a legislative decision would be subject to review 
and change, a plasticity missing in judicial constitutional decisions. 
There is certainly a place for policy-based judicial decision making, 
but the open interest balancing informed by society’s reasonable 
expectations and societal conventions155 that is necessary to give 
meaning to the search-and-seizure norm is not such a place.156 
Dean Sager thus excluded the search-and-seizure norm from his 
under-enforcement theory,157 noting that such contextual interest 
balancing makes it an inapt candidate for such analysis.158 
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, one could argue 
that no court—including the Supreme Court—should strike the in­
terest balance that interpreting the search-and-seizure norm re­
quires, but my argument need not go that far.  My point here is one 
of judicial prudence grounded as much in institutional competence 
as decisional legitimacy.  The Court has incorporated the Fourth 
Amendment’s search-and-seizure norm into the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, thus imposing it on the 
states.159  As such, it falls to the Court, as the final arbiter of federal 
law, to decide its meaning as a national, foundational limit on state 
action.  My point is that state courts should defer to the Court con­
cerning the content of that normative balance, not that no court 
could ever decide that meaning. 
Beyond these conceptual and prudential reasons counseling 
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the mean­
ing of constitutional search-and-seizure protections lie practical rea­
sons for normative uniformity as well.160  The search-and-seizure 
norm has become immensely complicated as courts struggle to craft 
the intermediate standards and particular rules by which this open-
ended norm is applied in each investigative context.161  The never­
155. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (using the yardstick of 
“widely shared social expectations” to measure the content of third-party consent as a 
basis for a reasonable search). 
156. To be sure, any such legislative action would be subject to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s up-only limitation, and it could well fall to the state court in reviewing 
that policy in a particular case to make that determination.  Since federal law to this 
point has examined the search-and-seizure norm principally from the perspective of 
protection against police excesses, that would be the perspective of the state court in 
answering this federal question. 
157. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. R 
158. See Fair Measure, supra note 108, at 1244 n.104. R 
159. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
160. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. R 
161. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. R 
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ending stream of Fourth Amendment cases that each year are de­
cided and reported throughout the nation bears witness to this con­
tinual expansion and mutation of the doctrine.162  As already noted, 
this norm and its doctrinal web is aimed at and must be applied by 
police officers in the field, often in the face of unanticipated, rapidly 
unfolding circumstances.163  The set of rules limning the bounds of 
constitutional behavior is complicated enough without adding an­
other, separate layer of state doctrine on top of extant federal stan­
dards and rules.  To be sure, conflicts between state and federal 
rules or standards should, for state officers, be resolved in favor of 
the more demanding state rules, and state and local officers would 
presumably be trained in accordance with the state version of the 
norm.  But two layers of overlapping rules cannot but create confu­
sion, particularly in instances in which state and federal officers op­
erate with one another, each subject to different rules. This 
possibility of confusion further dilutes the added protection that in­
dividuals might receive from an ostensibly more demanding state 
constitutional version of this norm. 
None of this suggests, however, that state courts are relegated 
to the sidelines in interpreting or applying the search-and-seizure 
norm, only that deference to the Supreme Court here is appropri­
ate.  When, as in a case like Connolly, the federal meaning or scope 
of the normative protection is open, state courts are free—indeed, 
obligated—to flesh out the meaning of the norm, but as a matter of 
162. Almost every term, the Supreme Court decides several Fourth Amendment 
cases that extend or change the face of the search-and-seizure norm or its remedy. See, 
e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (overturning almost thirty years of case law 
governing the limits of automobile searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant); 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (extending the exclusionary rule’s good-
faith exception to the fruits of arrests based on faulty, negligently maintained police 
records of outstanding warrants).  The ink on these opinions was barely dry before a 
circuit split arose on the application of the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception to 
fruits of car searches, lawful when conducted but unlawful after Gant. Compare United 
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1042-45 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying good-faith excep­
tion to exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in reliance on Belton, the case overruled 
by Gant), with United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2009) (de­
clining to apply good-faith exception based on Belton reliance, citing conflict with retro­
activity principles).  In Davis v. United States, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010), the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve 
this issue.  And so it goes and will continue to go. 
Viewing this doctrinal growth from the admittedly parochial perspective of a law 
professor, the same casebook’s pages that I have used in teaching just a portion of 
Fourth Amendment law over the past quarter century have more than doubled, from 
some 300 to well over 600, an admittedly crude but nevertheless telling measure of the 
increasing breadth and complexity of this search-and-seizure doctrine. 
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. R 
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federal, not state, law.164  At the time the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered Connolly, there were some tea leaves from old Supreme 
Court decisions from which one could attempt to predict how the 
Court might answer the question, along with a few lower federal 
court and state supreme court decisions going both ways, but there 
was nothing close to definitive concerning the Fourth Amendment’s 
answer to this question.165  There was even less certainty under Ar­
ticle 14.166  The only thing certain was that the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the highest court in Massachusetts, had undoubted positive-
law authority to found its decision in either provision, federal or 
state.167  Had the court based its decision on the Fourth Amend­
ment, the decision would have resolved Connolly’s constitutional 
claim,168 would have been consistent with the presumption of a na­
tional uniform search-and-seizure norm, and would have afforded 
the Supreme Judicial Court a timely and appropriate voice in the 
development of this fundamental normative protection.169  That is 
hardly a sidelines role in national search-and-seizure jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by returning to Dean Sager’s question: when 
in state-constitutionalism should a state court defer to the Supreme 
Court in the interpretation of a cognate constitutional provision?170 
As a matter of presumption, always.  Given that the constitutional 
164. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 367-68 (Mass. 2009). 
165. Id. 
166. See id. at 369-70.  As noted above, the only authority that the court cited in 
support of its Article 14 holding was a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in a twenty-
five year-old case. Id. at 369 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984)). 
167. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369-70. 
168. If the court had couched its decision in Connolly as a Fourth Amendment 
decision, there would have been nothing further for the court to decide under Article 
14.  As noted, the court went on to hold that the execution of the GPS warrant within a 
fifteen-day period (which was outside the seven-day period required by Massachusetts 
statute for the execution of some warrants) was reasonable, but this was as a matter of 
state common law, not constitutional law. See id. at 371. 
169. One of the criticisms of state-court deference to the Supreme Court, either 
through the lockstepping or supplemental approach, is that the differing views of the 
state courts on these important constitutional issues are lost, providing no counter­
weight to the views of the nine judges on the Court.  That may be a price to be paid for 
national uniformity as to those cognate provisions for which the presumption holds, but 
not always, as this case shows.  However the issue might ultimately be decided by the 
Supreme Court, if it ever is, the Supreme Judicial Court would have been heard and 
could have provided authority, albeit limited to its persuasive force outside the Com­
monwealth, concerning the Fourth Amendment’s meaning in this regard, a matter that 
is almost certain to arise elsewhere. 
170. Sager, supra note 1, at 959. 
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overlap here at issue only arises in the case of core constitutional 
values common to the nation and its fifty constituent parts, a pre­
sumption of common meaning, state and federal, is justified.  And 
in our nation, in which states are assigned a subordinate role, if 
judgments differ concerning the content of a fundamental constitu­
tional norm, it again seems justifiable to look to the Supreme Court 
as the constitutional arbiter. 
But this presumption of uniformity, with state-court deference 
to the Supreme Court in its service, should give way in the face of 
compelling conceptual and practical reasons.  As I have tried to 
demonstrate, all constitutional norms—even fundamental ones— 
are not the same.  If as is true with the protection against unreason­
able searches and seizures, the normative protection delineates a 
core liberty interest common to both the nation and its fifty constit­
uent states, it makes sense that the subordinates in that political 
relationship defer to their superior concerning the meaning and 
scope of that interest.  Certainly in the case of the search-and­
seizure norm, this deference is more than an aesthetic preference, 
because the states’ subordinate status is underscored by their innate 
inability to fully implement a different, expanded version of that 
norm within their own borders.  So, without even accounting for 
prudential and practical concerns that counsel against state consti­
tutional expansion of search-and-seizure protections, state courts 
simply have no business re-configuring this national balance of con­
stitutional interests. 
On the other hand, there are many constitutional protections, 
like the right to counsel, that provide procedural protection to the 
fundamental liberty interest in avoiding wrongful convictions. 
Here, states overcome their subordinate status and with it the pre­
sumption that their courts ought to defer to the Supreme Court in 
giving state constitutional shape to these core normative protec­
tions.  Enhancing the right-to-counsel protection or ones like it for­
tifies rather than redefines the underlying, national liberty interest, 
and states are able to fully implement such expanded protections 
because their reach is wholly local. 
In the end, allowing or even encouraging state constitutional 
expansion of core national constitutional protections does not force 
a choice between deference and dissonance.  Fundamental norma­
tive protections that are by nature uniquely national, where states 
cannot escape their subordinate status, should be the province of 
the nation and its Supreme Court.  But those normative protec­
tions, although of fundamental, national import, that are essentially 
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local in their implementation and effect should be fair game for in­
dependent state constitutional enhancement.  There is nothing dis­
sonant about lack of deference in that instance.  It is merely playing 
out Professor Gardner’s observation that in our brand of federal­
ism, states are in that peculiar position of sometimes being 
subordinate to—but other times being independent of—the nation 
of which they are a part. 
